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The Democrats lost the 1929 presidential election, historians agree, 
as a result of the cumulative effect of the resentments directed against. 
President Woodrow Wilson by progressives, farmers, and wor.kers, the coali-
1 
I 
tion that had kept him in the White House.in 1916. Wilson· paid this price 
! 
I 
of political· damage to his presidency and his patty by giving priority to 
, I 
' 
world affairs. at the expense of domestic problems. Americans .came 'to see 
the President as a remote figure, absent at .the Versailles peace conference 
the first six !"cinths of 1919, preoccupied upon his return with the.treaty 
ratification struggle, and shielded in the White House for months following 
his October stroke. The President's aloofness from his own advisers and 
his fierce partisanship gave Republicans the chance to portray his·admin-
istration as inept one-man government. They cqnvinced voters that•Wilson 
was responsible for the social and economic upheaval growing out of the 
postwar readjustment process. The Republicans returned to power OJ). the 
back of the anti-Wilson feeling that they helped create. A caption of a 
contemporary New York World cartoon, "The GOP washed in by the waves of 
r 
'National Discontent'," captured the heart of the Democratic defeat. 
A major cause in the. revulsion against:Wilsonianism that was ktrik~ 
ingly manifested' in· the 1920 election was the Pre'sident 1 s failure to deal 
with inflation effectively, a factor that'has not been given sufficient 
weight in existing works on the immediate past. The effect of the European 
war from 1914 .to 1916 on the American cost of living was a comparatively 
I 
mild 14 percent. America's war years, however, saw inflation zoom, 39 'jler.., 
cent in 1917 and 24 percent in 1918.
3 
Policies of the Treasury and the Food 
Administration were responsible for this devastating price surge; : The 
Treasury's decision to finance war costs 
. I 
by loans rather than taxes was 
. I 
I 
an important contributing factor for monetary expansion and conseq)lent 
I 
i 
' 2 I 
inflation. The Food Administration policy of guaranteed prices well above 
prewar levels on wheat, hogs, and sugar demons tr·· ·-d that production not 
i.J. 
inflation was the agency's first concern. Treas;;c·;r Secretary W;LlliiJ.m McAdoo 
. I ·~ • .: . 
. . . 
and Food Administrator Herbert Hoover relied on voluntarism, exhor:'tation, 
·and encouragement of private thrift and conserva~ion instead of hi~her taxes 
and the stringent price controls available in the Lever Food Control Act. The 
' 
government did not take into consideration the problems. which their finance 
{ 'c 
meth_.ods would raise after the war.· After the Armistice, in order 
\, ... ·'.· 
to meet large scale expenditures and to sell bonds to finance the federal 
deficit, the Treasury was compelled to maintain its. 'easy-money pol'~cy' 
Lo 
during most of 1919. The resulting price upturn continued virtually 
without interruption until prewar prices had doubled by June 1920. 
Inflation, the High Cost of Living or more familiarly HCL, was the 'major 
domestic issue in 1919-1920. 
Wilson's coalition., fragile at best i ,had begun. to unravel when. the . 
basis for special interest orientation developed during arrl because of the 
government's mobiliza":tion policies of 1917-1918. Progressives 
in large part liad misgiving~ when Hilson took the nation 
into war and disappointments with his abandonment of civil liberties. 
Normally Republican midwest wheat farmers, enticed into the coalition by 
' the Farm Loan Act of. 1916,. gathered a number of grievances against 'admin-. 
istration price control poJ icies. While business profits and cotton P.rices 
' 
were free of controls, wheat was held at $2.20.a bushel. Wilson's decision 
to veto. a twenty cent increase accounted for their defection .from the Demo-
crats in the November 1918 Congressional el<;>ctions. Urban workers~ on their 
part, were unable to identify their interests with a Democratic party con-
• trolled by rural southerners. Also, despite Wilson's support of wage increases 
. I 
and creation of the War Labor Board, the· largest number of strikek in history 
expressed labor's discontent with the government's stand on union~ and wages.1 
The High Cost of Living, touching the welfare of every American, accelerated , 
this disintegration of the Wilson coalition and, at the same time 1, heightened 
the movement toward the special interest politics of postwar America. 
3 
In the six months of a vacant White House, December 5, 1918, to Jtily 8, 
1919, executive department heads were left to devise their own respons'es to 
' 
HCL agitation by a President who, defending his 
and his reluctance. to take deflationary action, 
lengthy presence in Europe 
contended that no econ~mic 
I 
recovery was possible without world peace, and, in any case, prices probably 
. I 
would permanently stabilize close to.postwar levels. Often more cont'en-
1 
I 
tious than cooperative, departments and agencies generally worked at c;r:oss-
purposes that confused and angered businessmen, farmers, and workers. ' 
Most notable in this regard was a Commerce-Treasury plan, the Industrial 
Board, approved by Wilson on February 13, to fix prices by government-' 
industry agreement that broke-up in acrimonious exchange between 'secretar.ies 
William Redfield and Carter Glass, the latter dismayed at Redfield's 
. a~ antitrust: liberalization.~ ·Farmer and worker spokesmen, upset by 
' attempt 
the 
ab.sence of representation on the business-dominated Board, perceived tpreats 
to their welfare when the Board promised to lower food prices and wages .. 
"The longer government ·people fool with prices." complained Wallace's 
4 
Farmer, "the worse off we will be." The.executive committee of the Ameri.,-
of Labor I 
can Federation"-made its position clear; they would fight ·any attempt a,t 
10 Recognizing the political liabilities, 
wage reduction. "·· Joe Tumulty, the President's eyes 
and ears in Washington, ·told··. Redfield "to ring .. down the curtain on ,this ,, 
performance· because the audience is getting awfully sick." At Tumulty's 
I 
insistence, Wilson dissolved the Board on May 8. No longer on speaking 
terms with Redfield, Glass turned on Agriculture ·secretary David .Hous~on 
insisting that his "buy now" campaign was undercutting the Treasury's bond 
IY 
sales efforts.. Republicans were quick to criticize: the 
complaining on one occasion that the War Departments's 
administration, 
I 
delays' in .distri-
inefficient adjin-
1 
buting surplus. food stocks was .a typical b1under of an 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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4 
istration, and on another, joining consumer complaints "that the government's 
I 
I 
food relief program should pay attention to the· dangers of J;amine and a'par-
chy, not in Europe, but in America.13 Turning on its cri~ics, the ad~in~s­
The ·cause of inflation, clalimed tration -subs·tituted scapegoats for policy. 
1 
'. 
government officiafa, was the hoarding and profiteering of selfish busipess-
1 
men and farmers, the excessive wage demands of disloyal workers, and th1e 
. wasteful l;iuying of extravagant· consumers. America was to be. badly gove'rned 
in Wilson's last two years in office. 
More· significant ·for its long-term corrosive effect on the Wilson 
coalition's 
').~ 
January for 
~ 
anxiety about UCL was the President's request cif Congress on 
I 
-a billion dollar budget to enable the Grain Corporation to man-
I 
age the wheat export market until June 1, 1920, the expiration date of 1the 
government agreement to buy wheat at $2.26 a bushel. The entire fabric, 
of the domestic economy Herbert Hoover,- the bill '_s author, had persuaded 
. the President_, depended upon using the appropriation to enable t)l.e Graiµ 
Corporation to buy wheat at the guaranty price. Without 
according to Hoover, with a hungry world bidding in the 
I 
government control, 
I 
I 
AmeriCan wheat! 
market, stocks would be overdrawn, leaving the country facing shortages: 
in the spring of 1919. If that occurred, "We shall. liave an era of high; 
prices, of profiteering and speculatio_n , such as we have never 
1+ 
he warned Wilson. 
experiebced, 11 
' 
' I 
I 
The Treasury had fought the President's support.of Hoover's 
I 
propos'als 
! . 
from their inception in late October 1918. Determined to maintain the 
Department's wartime domination of monetary and fiscal·policy, Secretary 
tf' I 
McAdoo has"pressed Wilson to accept Treasury leadership. Cartel: 
' . . . 1.1 
Glass, his successor on December lo, advocated limited loans. to the Al ifs 
. i 
for wheat purchases, and a commitment.to free i:rade principles. Contra d'·i ct li11: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
! 
t 
I 
f 
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Hoover's prediction of a world wheat shortage, Glass foresaw the addition 
of abundant Canadian, Australian, and Argentine wheat to a. bumper 1919I 
I 
American wheat Harvest depressing the world wheat price far below Hoov;er's 
I 
"artificial" prices. Freed from government intervention, tumbling wheat 
. I 
prices would·trigger the deflation of all food and industrial prices. I To 
pl:otect farmers from loss, the Sec_retary recommended direct compensation to 
. '" them from the billion dollar appropriation. Hoover, Glass ·suspected : was 
exaggerating the Bolshevist threat and overstati~g Europe's plight to impress 
i? 
the President with the high importance of his .role as Relief Director. 
The President, back in the country on February 24, used his preseµce 
t8 
to move the wheat bill into law four days later. The decision on whether 
the billion dollar appropriation be used to hold wheat at the'.guarantY) 
or pay farmers directly was now Wilson's t,o make.' Again Hoover and 
Glass clashed. In a memo from Paris, Hoover reminded Wilson of the importance 
of a controlled price policy both to the European.relief program and the 
American economy. He dismissed Glass's direct compensation idea as imprac-
tical; Congress; he claimed, would not have time to make an orderly disburse-
ment to fifteen million farmers before the country woulp be 
I 
·overtaken by a 
I 
I~ 
"most disastrous financial collapse." Glass met with Wilson on I February 26 
I 
to press his case. Direct compensation, he maintained, would satisfy ~he 
.government's moral obligation to farmers and the consequent cost of living 
I 
' 
reduction its moral obligation to consumers. "In t1me of serious and ~rowing 
I 
unemployment, of grave social unrest, and of definite and avowed attempts 
a't social revaluation," he told the President, "to maintain now •.• by de-
liberate act of government an unnecessarily high price on fopd was 
'1.0 
injustice to our people." No doubt taken back b.y the vehemence of 
statement, Wilson left for Europe on March 5 without a decision on 
an i 
I 
GlaSs's 
I wheat. 
I 
f 
I 
I 
6 
During the weeks following Wilson's return to ·Versailles, HCL developed 
' /0 
into a burning national issue. Retail food prices rose ~ percent- in March. 
and April. Postw_ar inflationary forces were at work. With pent_-up ,Jar 
. I 
. I 
profits and savings, business and consumer demand for capital and durable 
. ' i ' 
. goods, along with foreign' demand for Americ.an manufactures
1 
expanded n\ore 
.... _ 
.rapidly than production. A "demand-pull" type of iriflatio_nary process was 
1.1 
at work. To the man-in-the-street, whatever ·the economist's explanation, 
"Everything is' goitig up-food, rent, clothing, taxes. No won:der people on 
...... 
fixed incomes are suffering." The White House.was deluged.with petitions 
for relfef from the National Consumers teague, the National.Housewives 
League, the Women's Civic Federation, the General Federation of Women's 
Clubs. The League of Women Voters threatened Congressmen who did n~t vote 
for legislation to check food prices with loss of the League's endorsement.· 
The New York State legislature wanted a National Food Commissioner, and 
i-3 
Wisconsin politicians-a.Federal Food Committee.· Government action not 
explanation was the con·sumers' cry across the country. 
Wilson's decision when it came on April 16 authorizing the Graih Car-
poration to use thE;> billion dollar fund to buy wheat at the guaranty damaged 
extensively his relations with his constituericy'. Wilson decided, for one 
thing, that a regulated market ensured success for the food relief p_rogram. 
In addition, possible collapse of the midwestern agricultural complc'x of 
farmers, grain traders, millers, and bankers, he conclud~d,· wa's a da~ger .to •.'/· 
the country that outweighed the hardships that inflation might caus1 ~onsumers. 
Much of the bitterness this decision caused. Wilson can be attributed to 
' his association with Hoover. Envied for his rapid rise to power during the 
war, the ambitious Hoover had· created·many enemies in both parties.: In a 
postwar environment envenomed by suspicion and slander of men in pubiic 
I 
7 
life, Hoover's integrity was attacked. Two frequent charges were that he 
had turned the Food Adminstratiori over to a grain trade clique, and 
i.r 
~hat 
I 
' 
he 
had suppressed an FTC report of meat packer greed. A move was made ~n 
Congress to have the Red.Cross adminster food relief, while I Secretary 
I 
Glass led opposition within the administration .to block the appointment 
. '1-b 
of Julius Barnes, a Hoover man, to head the Grain Corporation •. 
The administration's wheat guaranty policy, the.work of Wilson and 
Hoover, was identified in ·the public mind as the principal cause of infla-
tion. At its national convention in April, the president of the National 
Association of HanufacturEfs asserted: "The. cost of living is hung on the 
' 
peg of $2.26 wheat." He cited a questionnaire.of 4,400 NAM members who 
\. ") 
agreed that "high prices were due to government decree." Labor was 9f 
the same·mind. Under pressure from local councils, the AFL executive 
committee decided at its convention in June to call for an end to "govern-
1-8 
ment intervention to control prices." The actions of wheat farmers added 
to the public belief that the.administration had acted unwisely. During 
' 
March and April, when prices had climbed as Grain Corporation sales i;educed 
the wheat surplus, farmers added to inflation· pressures by withholding wheat 
l1 
from market, expecting to sell later at a crest price. A business journal 
saw a lesson for the country, ·· "The unfortunate pledge 
already given to agriculture should be a warning," according to the Financial 
I 
.and Commercial Chronicle," of the ungrateful re~ponse .the country shfuld 
expect from any economic group receiving special privileges from the» 
;a 
government." Sensitive to the political·harm.of .these developments,· 
_Joe Tumulty cabled his concerns to the President on May 12. ''The 
~I 
issue of HCL acute. Wheat is the keystone in the arch of high pricesl" 
. While the.guaranty, it was widely believed was considered 
a major inflation factor, ., 
8 
strikes and the meat paclcers were also thought to be HCL props. 
I 
Strike seemed end.emic in America in 1919; four million 
workers had walked off their jobs; the entire Boston police force 
struck in September. Not only were these radical-led unions pushing 
. up the cost of living with exhorbitant wage d.emands, but so was the 
meat packer monopoly.' the "Food Trust". "Is the day approaching," 
the New York Times asked, "when people must eat out of the hands of the 
·sv .. 
Chicago packers, or .starve?" Again with his .~r to the. ground, 
Tumulty on June 30 urged Wison to move the government against the packers. 
Public unrest over high prices mounted;. the President was the target, 
A farm journal claimed: "The subject most talked about in the United 
States today is not war, not .the League of Nations, not who will be 
rv 
next president. It is prices." On June 27, Massachusetts legislators 
cabled Wilson: The citizens of the· United States want you home to 
reduce the high cost of living which we consider far more important than 
3{ 
the League of Nations;" Republicar;r.began asking why the government 
was failing to enforce the anti-profiteering s.ections of the '.Lever' ActJ~ 
On July 8, .treaty in hand, the President returned to Wash~ngton 
to find the n'ation alarmeq to the point of hysteria over the surging 'rise 
·of consumer prices. Continued inaction on ·the'. HCL issue, the President 
knew, was political dynamite. 
Deciding to take Tumulty's advice, the President initiated 
action against the packers. On July 11, he released a Federal Trade; 
' 
Commission. report that ·:desc;ribed"an .approach of.'.-packer domination oil all 
n 
. important foods in the country." On Wilson's ord~rs, .the Attorney 
A. Mitchell PalJUer, · 
General on August .s, instructed District Attorneys. to enforce· rigidly· the 
' ) " . 
penal sections of the Lever Act as part of "a country-wide campaign , 
. I ,,3r 
against hoarders and profiteers. The next day.the antitrust divisi~n 
filed suit against the packers for unlawful re:straint of .trade. 
3 ~ 
33 
9 
In responding ·to .an issue he had pushed. aside for months, 
Wilson may have n6t gone beyond these. actions if it Had not been 
brought home to him that the HCL controversy was, endanger.ing -support' 
. . Ii for the tre_aty .. Publie·:resentment about government ina~tention. 
to HCL, his Cabinet told him on July 28, was being transferred to 
. ..i.o 
-ratification of the treaty. The next day, Homer Cummings, National 
Chairman of the Democratic party, reported toTUmulty the results of 
survey of 
his Midwest and Pacific coast"political attitudes. "The p.~ople were 
1 
far more concerned with the in.er.ease in the cost of living than in 
the debate in the Senate over the League. "For Wilson to delay action 
. fl 
against HCL .wouici jeopardize the treaty,'~ the. chairinan warned. William McAdoo 
agreed. "The people here are more concerned with:,domestic questicins 
than the League Covenant," he told Wilson. "The high cost of living, .taxation, 
the railroad issue and the.general unrest are occupying the thoughts. 
of everybody to a much greater degree than international problems." 
In .his report, Cummings, as chief political strategist, went 
beyond the fate of treaty to the fate of the party. -The 1920 presi-
dential rac.e was on his mind. He had take.n seriously the earlier 
remark of hi~ Republican counterpart, Will Hays, that the H$L crisis was an 
oppo.r-tunity to alienate workers and farmers from their 1916 Democratic 
'f 3 
allegiance. Cummings saw it happening
1
he had told Tumulty on July 14, 
not by. Republican action but Democratic inaction ... Farmers .were convinced, 
"'V he said, that the adminstration was not protecting their interests. ' 
Two lfeeks later he repeated this ·warning to .the President: labor 
and farm groups were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the 
. If{" 
Democratic party ·leadership.He, as did others, advised Wils.on, to 'ltct· 
before the Republicans seized the issue. 
Vlo 
I 
10 
I 
These pressures forced the President to pay full attention to HCL. 
. I 
In a rush of events, he reviewed the wheat market with Wheat Directo~ 
on July 30 J · 
Barnes who assured him that the Grain Corporation could hold the guaranty • . . I 
"l1 . . . . 
and at the same time feed Europe. Later. that .day Railroa,d Adminis):raJtor 
Walker Hines and Head of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers·Warren 
. . I 
' 
Stone were in the Oval Office to discuss government reaction to the 1de-
cision of the Railway Wage Board on July 11 not to sanction P'!Y rais,es~ 
The unions had threatened a nation-wide rail strike unless the gove;rnment 
I 
granted their wage demands. To head off a strike, Hines and Stone .~ro-
1 
posed to Wilson that, in re.turn for a 90-day no-strike pledge frcim the 
I 
1. '/Fi' 
nninns. th" President commit the government to .stein inflation. withi!f 'that time, 
Wilson's agreeement tied solution of the railroad wage question·to the 
success of· the HCL campaign. The next day the President ordered At~orney 
, ··n I . 
General Mitchell Palmer to organize an anti-inflation campaign. At.a 
. I 
meeting of exect1tive department officials that afternoon in Palmer's 
office, Hines, Leffingwell, and William Colver, chairman of the Federal 
Jo 
Trade Commission, agreed to_ draw up a plan. On August 1, Wilson an~ounc.ed 
to his Cabinet "a comprehensive program attacking the high cost of.living 
all along the line by ·way of the law of 
' 
l enforcement and the law of sug-
1 Ir 
gestion" _was underway. The "Committee of Three" -recommendations were 
l 
that the.Justice Department and the Federal Tra.de Commission work "ip. 
I J . ' : V' 
tandem to halt profiteering, and that the wheat guaranty be abandoned. 
Anticipating Tumulty and Leffingwell lobbying of Wfl~on, Barnes metl twice 
. . . . I 
-w1th the President, -and Hoover sent him two cables. Europe is being fed _, 
J .3: 
and the wheat market is strong was the essence of their argumen·t._ 
' Utilizing a parliamentary, device, the joint session,· that had ·frequently 
,, I • I 
filled bis need for political theatre since his days as New Jersey governor, 
Wilson stood before both houses of Congress for th_e l_ast; time on August 8 
' . 
11 
I 
I to dramatize his HCL campaign. First announcing that the wheat guaranty 
I 
objectives were being met, he went on to describe hoarding ;;md profiteering 
I . 
as the major causes of in.flation. Wilson promis·ed action; th~ Justice· 
. I 
Department was ·initiating : ant.itrust prosecution against the meg.t lackers; 
the Feqeral 
I 
Trade Commission was investigating price· fixing in the food and· .clothing 
industries. He asked for emergency powers under the Lever Food Conttol 
. I 
Act, funds for additional Justice Department personnel, and authoritt to 
I supervise the business community in order to prevent hoarding and speculation. 
I . 
Wilson 'tied the. HCL issue to treaty ratification. ·HCL was rooted in! unset.tled 
world affairs, he claimed: "There can 
I 
be no settled conditions herei.or . r~ 
elsewhere until the treaty of peace is out of the way.; •. " 
i 
I 
Wil.son' s pledge did not pa~ify his raiil road employees. On Augu$t 27; 
the union brotherhoods, voted'. to strike. Palmer urged Wilson not to!back 
.r.l 
down. "Concessions," said Palmer, "would utterly crush the· campaign." 
In his Labor Day message, Wilson promised wage adjustments for ra'ilroad 
f' 
workers if the campaign against inflation failed. For the ·administration, 
I . 
the quarrel with its own employees was an embarra·ssment as well as a1source 
I 
_of estrangement with the labor movement. The International Ladies . I . Garment 
I 
Workers asked.: "How can cine advise· workers to wait in the dim bopel that 
I J" 
I ' 
'HCL will come down? Who can say that high prices are at the.ir peak?]' But 
Wilson had put the iss~e behind him. Again absorbed in the treaty, he 
I . . . 
commenced his Western tour for treaty ratification on September 3. His 
I 
reference to·inflation at St. Paul was his only public statement on the 
inflation iss.ue· for the remainder 'of 1919. The HCL campaign was no1 in 
·hands of Attorney General Palmer. 
I 
·Palmer applied to the campaign what the President had called "the 
law of enforcement and the law of suggestion," that is, th~ coer~ivel powers 
I 
12 
of the Lever Act and the organized.propaganda techniques to arouse emo~ion 
I 
against profiteers that the Treasury and the Food Administration ha:d used· 
during the war to sell bonds and conserve food. 
I 
I Like McAdoo and Hoover, 
·Palmer attempted. to promote voluntary cooperation through. the ballyhoo ·of . 
j"8 . 
noisy· demonstrations and appeals to patriotism. But the Attorney General 
t t Th t S t .b h • . h' .· R d 'd . I cl wen o excess. a ep em er e 'tV'as organizing is· a11t1- e rive. an 
. ' . 
used the same doomsday t·one in the HCL campaign that lie used· in .pledgih~ 
. . I 
to rid the country of Bolshevists. The two campaigns had the same·obj¢ctive, 
I 
he declared, namely' to check every menace to American .instft'utions "b~cause 
.. both Bolshevism and HCL ·were dan.gers to the national interest." If thl HCL 
campaign were not won, he warned, the!). "wlien the scant-dark days of wilter 
come ••• we will see starvation wa'lk the streets of our cities and hand ffn 
hand with starvation will come another menace 
Both campaigns shared Palmer's proclivities 
... and restrictions on free speech. 
. l ft 
of which I need not spea;k." . 
for rai~s, use of violetice, 
! 
I 
Palmer also used the gove~nment's coercive powers to a greater dtgree· 
than the. Food.Administration had during the·war. He appointed H~ward Figg, 
a Kansas lawye~, to head the HCL division with orders to cooperate with 
. I 
the FBI and the FTC in amassing evidence of profiteering for prosecut~on 
. b I) i . 
under the Sherman and Clayton antitrust laws and the Lever Act·. Paliper 
. I 
also revived the Food Administration's wartime fair price committee system, 
~I 
again with a difference. The.Fo'od Administration had appealed to patriotism 
I 
to encourage cooperation; Palmer favored intimidation to expose profi,teers. 
The evidence in profiteering cases was gathered.through ·a complaint 
card system that draw thousands of women into the campaign. Palmer appealed 
to them to join his .cr~sade "to save America through an example of wi.se 
. . I 
spending and frugal living"; otherwise, he maintained, "the country w
1
as 
. ~y 
headed toward social and economic ·disaster." ·The New York Times foresaw . . I 
a Palmer-organized :'·'.Housewives Brigade, 11 fifty thousand strong, complaint 
' ,. 
., 
13 
cards in hand, marching through the shops of the city, checking prj.c_es, and 
. ~3 
reporting profi.teers. In fact, ten times fifty thousand women _across the 
country responded. In Alabama, women organized Patchem and Wearem 
A clothing conservation drive was launched in Kansas to popularize 
cl~bs.­
i 
l1oke 
I 
' dressmaldt\g ·and sewing. Women in Georgia and Nebraska, Minnesota and, Maine 
began groups such as Crusaders Against HCL, Buy Right Club, and Buyers 
Vigilance Committee. The Lower Cost of Living Club members in New'Hampshire 
' recited. while shopping: "To market, to market/ to ·buy a fat pig/Home, again, 
\, + 
home again/The price is too big." 
The Justi.ce Department sent invitations to 183 women.' s organizations 
to cooperate. Among the more influential responding were the Nationdl 
Consumers League, General Federation of Women's Clubs, and the League of 
Women Voters. At their meetings, club members were requested to pledge 
to . '1(1 teach mo.re production,· nun.·e cons·eTVq'.tio)l," moYe resporis:lliility to 
Government. 2) Teach.English, preach our form of government. Show advan-
tages of our laws. 3) Root out agitators. Instill in the htbor class the 
fdf 
thought that agitators should not be feared or tolerated. 11 Palmer-style 
voluntary cooperati.on, laced with a strong nativist atti tu•.i"', suspicion of 
the foreign-born, arid distrust of worker patriotism, was: a. .cause of postwar 
war hysteria. tha.t has been overlooked. 
The feminist movement, .then at its height, partially accounts for the 
enthusiatic participation.of women -tk -in,HCL campaign. Activists dreamed of . 
a more equitable society. Perhaps General Federation Magazine expressed 
this sentiment best: "The women who fought for prohibition and got it, 
' ' 
for suffrage and have it so nearly, for protection of our children and 
have the child labor law, for the protection of women in industry and have 
the maximum and minimum wage law, can get what they want in this country. 
And if they want to reduce the high cost of living and catch the profiteer, 
t.A''l1.· "(lff':) - ,:;-7-1 
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! 
! 
they can do it if they ,;ill." 
The diligenc.e of ·women enabled Palmer 1 s agents to catch and prosecute 
I 
170 alleged profiteering retailers. Hoarders were exposed; after 86 f9od 
warehouse raids, Figg an1'ounced his "flying squadrons" had confiscated huge 
p I amounts of butter, meat,. beans, and ten million dozen eggs. Despite the 
energy exjiended and the booty captured, prices. continued to climb. 
' Republican press and politicians professed cynicism of the intentions 
.of the administration whirlwind. William Allen White,·the Kansas aaJe, 
I 
to stabilize the ballot for 
r, r . suspected that much.of ·the raiding was done the 
·Democratic party rather than ·the market for consumers. "American people," 
' I 
the New York Tribune sneered, "can be quieted .by buncombe and l?Y the \parade 
'11 :· 
of quack remedies if garnished with ·noise and loud promises." Henry 1Cabot 
I 
. Lodge cha.rged that Wilson wa.s using the HCL crisis 
10 
entering the League on the President's terms. The 
I 
to coerce the Senate 
. hi. postwar partisans ip 
' 
into 
in 
1919 had first erupted.with Republican demands for a· special sess.ion •of the· 
66th Congress they would control with the intention of forcing Wilso~ into 
a fore:tin policy partnership. Tumulty saw opportunity for Wilson in agree-
' 
ment; a con.ciliatory response, would disarm his opponents, 
I 
he believed, 
·1 
and also demonstrate presidential leadership to a business community 'upset 
11 I 
by a sluggish economy. Tumuity was not alone amo.ng De~ocrats who cori'.sidered. 
' 
Wilson's _aggressiveness toward .Republicans a mistake. Colonel House was of 
this opinion, but judged Wilson's attitude that of a man "accustomed to 
1Y 
dictatorial ways which are hard to give up." In an ' angry exchange with 
I 
·Republican leaders on February 28, Wilson told them he would not cal] a 
11 I . 
session until his r;.tum from Europe with the completed treaty. In r
1
etalia:-
tion, a Republican filibuster on the last day of the lame-duck 65th C.ongress, I . . . 
March 4, prevented passage of appropriation bills that eventually forred 
I 
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Wilson to open a special session on May 19. Adding the 1920 presidential 
election maneuvering to Republican provocations and Wilson obstinacy poli·~. 
ticized the UCL.issue. 
Clearly, it was to be up hill from the start for a HCL campaign 
managed by a Democratic executive department that needed the cooperati:on of 
l 
a Republican-controlled Congress" Palmer requested the Senate ·committee 
on Agriculture to add food marketing cooperatives and clothing retailers 
. tf 
to the anti-profiteering sections of the Lever Act. The former were al.,-
ready a prime Justice Department target.· On August 12, a federal 
district court found the New York.State Milk Producers Association guilty 
1~ . 
of combining to raise milk prices. Indictments against dairy cooperatives 
in Chicago and Cleveland brought angry charges at committee. hearings by 
the milk producers group and the National Board of Farm Organizations that 
Figg' s men, breaking into their ·off.ices with drawn guns. had roughed up 
17 
employees. Wallace's Farmer described the raids as part of "The Game of 
Swatting Farmers," who "got a raw deal during the war, and now were being 
1~ 
. treated worse than ever;.., The Agriculture Committee promptly eXcluded 
cooperatives from prosecution, while leisurely delaying until December 
. . 11 
before giving ·Palmer authority. to prosecute clothing retailers. Not. having 
the.political clout of a farm bloc, clothing trade associations vainly pro-
fO 
tested their. liability to fines and jail terms • 
. Palmer had as much difficulty with Democrats as with Republicans. The 
Cab·inet' never in tull agreeu1t:1rl:. U!l l11.r1a-tio11 .causes' refused to uni tc 
behind a politically ambitious Attorney Genera1f'IThe President also created 
a serious problem for the campaign's success. 
when, after consultation with Russell Leffingwell of the Treasury,· hJ was 
I 
persuaded that bringing the packers to court was a mistake. "No judicious 
. . 
16 
student of the problem," in Leffingwell' s opinion, "believes that HCL will 
rv ; 
be materially affected by the pr·osecution of the packers." More to the point, 
such an attack on the business, community might well .jeopardize the TJeasury' s 
. I . 
reliance on private investment to provide credits for European recoqstruction, 
he reminded Wilson; American prosperity depended upon 
f·$ 
market •. In September. Wilson instructed 
. I 
I 
a healthy Eurqpean 
Tumulty to.advise Palmer to negotiate with packer representatives for an out-
Sl! 
of-court settlement. Sometime after the President's stroke in early' October, 
t.s' ' 
Tumulty reminded Palm.er of thes.e instructions. On October 28 1 Palmer: re~ 
:p.C:u:ted :to the Cabinet that "the Packers wished to come in and agree to give 
. fl, 
up wholesale and .retail grocery business, and etc. , if ·not indicted. 11 ~ The 
f1 ' 
consent decree was disclosed on December 18'. The deal with the packefS 
severely undercut the HCL campaign. 
From then on, the campaign labored under the public 1s conviction that 
the administration was "jailing the small profiteer but leaving the mechanism 
H 
of profi_teering untouched." Progressives were disappointed. Amos Pinchot 
' ~i askei!, "Are there different laws for ·swindlers rich and swindlers poor? ' 
The League of Women Voters described the campaign "as a pretentious ~tt'ack 
upon profiteers, a sham battle put up by the President, Congress, the, Depart-. ' tfb 
ment of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission." Labor and farm groups 
joined in condemnation of the consent decree. To the International Ladies 
Garment Workers it was "a government sell-out· to business," while Wallace's· 
~~ ... -... -
Farmer asked why the packers had not been placed "un'dei: government super-
! 'l 1 
vision and compelled tci use their big machine in the public interest i" The 
HCL campaign never regained the credibility it had lost with the consent 
I 
decree. \ton top of a 14 percent· cost of living increase in 1919, ··inflation 
I 
exploded in the first half of 1920, rising at.an annual rate of 24 percent. 
1. 9".-
Retail food prices on June 1 were 120 percent higher than before the'war. 
17 
The people blamed farmer greed, union wage demands, and. business profiteering, 
accusations that s.et the special interest groups at odds not only with each 
other but with the administration. In turn, among business, labor, f'armer 
there existed animosity which arose. f'rom the heightened special interest 
orientation of' each of'. these groups. 
Fears that th.e HCL campaign was attacking their interests. contributed· 
to the trend of farm. groups to consolidate into national organizations, and 
set up a Washington base from which to lobby Congress. The National Board 
of Farm Organizations and the Farmers National Council were active in the 
halls of Congress early in 1919; in November, the American Farm Bureau ·Fed-
eration was organized and its presence in Washington quickly felt. That ". 
11 
summer the Senate Farm Bloc was formed. Amcng its organizers was Arthur 
Capper of Kansas who launched a long career on the wave of farm agit ation. 
over HCL. "Every class is organized for self gain," he asserted. "Without 
complete' organization in the futur'.~, without ability and courage to act, 
agriculture is going to be robbed of the just fruits of its labor," '¥ 
No farm organization or journal called for cooperation with Palmer. 
Instead, the administration's· efforts was subjected to ridi.cule, To the 
National Grange Monthly, the campa_ign was a "r?aring farce in the midst 
. of increasing chaos and gloom invariably ending in a denunciation of pro-
~f 
fiteering farmers." The Corn Belt Meat Producers Association president 
·declared that the HCL drive was fleecing farmers "out of hundreds of" millions 
q~ 
of dollars.'' The more embattled farmers became the more tense their rela·-
tions with other economic groups. Senator Capper was in the forefront of 
those who charg~d the business community with responsibility for inflation. 
I 
He called for Republicans to support Palmer's prosecutions of retailer~ who, 
in turn, charged that the Farm Bloc was a source of misinformation on infla·~ 
I 
tion causes that was .detrimental to business interests and demanded that 
. q 7 
Capper end his business-baiting. 
18 
' The farm-business antagonism generated during the crisis did not: ap-
proach the. intens:i,ty of the antipathy displayed between agriculture and 
labor. Taking advantage of the anti-union sentiment in the country in the 
' 
fall of 1919 during the great labor-management struggles over unionis~ and 
I 
wages, farm groups attempted to shift the onus for·HCL to organized i!abor. 
I 
The unions had. no right to strike, declared the Missouri Farmers' Assoc.,,-,· 'IS , . 
iation, during the great national distress of HCL. Using the brush of de.-
famation, the recently-formed i'iaerican Farm Bureau Federation was not alone 
in its resolution urging labor to rid its ranks of Bolshevists and join the 
farm bureaus in their "unwavering faith in and full support of the Consti-
. . ~q 
tution of the United States." In metropolitan ar.eas, where food prices 
were 20 percent higher than the national average,·people were convinced that 
/ lf'J 
inflation was bottomed on.farmer greed. A veiled threat was the reaction 
of Canner's Farmer: "Faithful farmers who always produce sufficient, food 
for all had about reached the limit of their patience with city workers." 
1 •, I 
Rural-urban tensions increased through tpe HCL period .. 
In January 1920, to stimulate the sagging fortunes of the campaign, 
Palmer .Put the labor movement under sie.ge. He ordered an attack on .labor 
/OY 
as the prime cause of HCL. Speakers were instructed to argue: "As the union 
demands for more pay and shorter hours is granted, production declines,· 
-· a shortage of goods results' and like a skyrocket, up go prices to new levels .. 
Prices mount to staggering figures and the cry of· our ~orkers is for more 
pay and shorter hours- and u.p go the pric".s another notch. Must this vicious 
l c,3 
circle continue?" At their. conv:ention in February, the Wor;11en' s Trade Union 
League protested: "Be it resolved that we asli the Denartment ·of Justice that 
its propaganda be stopped at once. "i that this entir~ anti-union propaganda ,. . ' 
be re_.pudiated by the government." abor was angry, and rightly s9; labor's 
wage demands .were a desperate effort to keep up with prices that had spiraled 
under goverrm11mt policies. · ; 
I 
I 
! 
I "lf The business community, on its part, highly incensed with the Presic!ent 's 
claim that profiteering businessmen were responsible for inflation, were 
worr,ied about the .consequences of Lever Act prosecutions. Trade 
iations, among 'them the National Electric Light Association· and 
National Petroleum Association, expressed worry that·if people were:con-
vinced that profiteering was causing inflation, theY. will encourage; ~s 
the National Association of Manufacturers expressed it, "public officers 
,~ . . . 
to snoop into: one's business." The business, community wanted no· thr.eats 
fr!!l!n the government to its freedom of economic decision-making. 
"" 
Business· pressure had its effect on the government. 
' I 
Palmer. signaled 
1ob 
a truce. At meetings early in 1920 with clothing trade associations, 
' 
for 
' Figg agreed that the government in making the r.etailer the· scapegoat had 
" 
undermined public confidence in business. The government had,,he skid, 
I . 
"the bigger job in hand to save business than to satisfy public or labor 
101 
interests." 
Judging Figg's statement a sign of government weakness, retail ·trade 
associations were emboldened to defy federal authorities. In New York 
city, clothing store merchants heckled and refused to cooperate with in-
l ';;' 
. vestigators·. In Alexandria, Virginia, a sugar wholesaler denied agents 
access to his accounts. His chamber of commerce, he claimed, had advised 
'~~ " 
19 
members not to give information .. Few indictments were obtained, ac,cording 
to a 
when 
Department report, because "grand juries refused to indict especially 
I . flO I 
jurymen were engaged in coirunercial activity .n Businessmen wer'e pro-
I 
I 
tecting their own·. Federal court judg.es agreed with defendants who! argued 
that-the Lever Act, in declaring it _unlawful "for any person wilfU:llly 
I 
I 
to exact excessive prices of necessaries, 11 failed to define a reaso,nable 
. I 
profit. In a Spokane, Washington· case, the judge said the meaning fof 
"excessive" was uncerta.in because, "prices could not be. fixe_d arbiJrarily 
. 111 i 
·without reference to place and circumstances. 11 In St. Louis, the judge 
i 20 
I 
dismissed a sugar profiteering case on the grounds that .the Lever Act 
was "so vague and indefinite in- the definition of the crime as to lie in 
contravention of the sixth amendment • . . which states that 'In all 
criminal. prosecutions, the 
\ flY 
accused shall ... be informed of the nJture 
I 
' of the accusation." Having won only 29 of 517 cases in the lower courts, 
I 
I /I] 
the Justice Department appealed ten Lever cases to the Supreme Court. 
. ' 
It was evident by early summer that government profiteering prosecu-
tions were st.alled. 
Another wea.pon in. the HCL campaign was ineffectual. The fair price 
committee concept did not work for a· number of reas·ons. In August, 1919,. at 
the"beginning of the campaign, the National Conference of Governors pledged 
to establish state price commissions to organize and oversee community 
committees. 
Ohio, states 
Nine governors, including those.of California, Connecticut, and 
crucial to Palmer 1 s success, did not fulfill their promises: 
11 
o/. 
Considering the effort useless, Philadelphia and Cincinnati newspap~rs 
st~pped running fair price food lists1•15 Several judges', moreover, r~led t.hat 
f · · · h d · ' h . i /b . . 11 L ff:. 11 air price committees a no price-setting aut ority. Russe e ingwe 
of the Treasury, who claimed Palmer was· never authorized to organize these 
committees, put his finger on the most serious problem: the fair·price 
committees were not disposed to fight influential local merchants. For this 
reason,. he said, "I am very much afraid that the committees are now func-
. '. / 
tioning . . • to stabilize prices at a high level." .. This situation frus-
trated Figg. It was impossible to win price reductions from 
clothing retailers, he stated in his final report,· because they controlled 
the fair price committees. He cited the case in New York City where the 
president of B. Altman's, a large department store, was the committee 
chairman •. In order to avoid chaos in the industry, the chairman, Michael 
Friedman, informed Figg, only prices set by his committee woul~ be 
accepted by .the industr/t'rin challenging the government, organized business 
i 
and established groups by means of tra~associatton legal blocks and fair 
I 
price committee defiance were defeating public policy. 
21 
· of farmers and workers. 
While Figg' s agents continued to aggravate the special interests. through 
the 1920 summer, signs of .the campaign's disintegration were appearing, The 
Wilson government was beginning to break up. By May, Glass, Leffingwell, 
and Hines had resigned. Wilson's failure to recognize Figg's name in a 
progress report from Palmer was. a measure of the President's interest .in 
1 lq ' 
the campaign. · In July, Wilson, signalling .the end of the campaign, approved 
a Railroad Labor Board wage increase to all employees effective August .l, 
and retroactive to May l.· "Another nail in the 
the cost of living will fall," remarked the New 
coffin of the hopes that 
I l.r;, 
York World.· But HCL had. 
started to weaken by this time .. Government spending decreases and subsequent 
Federal Reserve credit tightening had balanced the.budget by the fall of 
1919, a·disinflation process that worked through the economy to bring food 
. , . f lo I 
.Pric·es in July down 2 percent. 
The Republican and Democratic platfdnns of their June conventions· 
revealed the campaign strategy each planned 'in order to shift to the other 
responsibility for HCL. Democratic bungling of HCL, the Republicans. 
charged, was evidence of the administration's ineptitude; lack of leader-
ship., and of intelligent planning. If the administration had enforced 
_the anti-profi.teering laws enacted by a Republican Congress, inflation 
would have ended. Instead, the Democrats had used the Lever Act ·"to continue 
its arbitrary and inquisitorial control of the life of the people in time , ...... 
of peace and to _carry confusion into industrial life." During the campaign, 
Republicans carefully nurtured the belief.that HCL was the result of Demo-
-
cratic mismanagement. In June, the House Judiciary Committee called for 
Palmer's resignation, alleging that he had been part of' a sugar price-rigging 
scheme. A SenaU- subcommittee investigating presidential campaign ·expendi-
. I 
tures in July heard charges th.at the St. Louis HCL office had be~n 'promoting 
Palmer's candidacy. The Attorney General, the committee charged, :was guilty 
of misusing HCL fundt1:'"~By such political tactics, the Republicans contrived 
to escape blame for the fai.lure of their Congress to meet its responsibilities 
in the H91 crisis. · 
On the def'ensive, not reco0azing that d:isinf'lation was lt 
work, the Democrats denied that Republic~ns had been.cooper~ti;e·i To 
the contrary, they claimed, the Congressional Republican··maJorityl had· 
· "raged against prof'iteering and the · 
high ccist of' living wi:thout enacting a single statute to make the ,f'ormer 
22. 
' I 
af'raid or doing a single act to bring the latter within limitations." The 
. . I 
platf'orm def'ended the administration's long-held contention that the-f'irst 
s~ep. toward American economic· recovery was ratif'ication of' the ·tr~aty and 
membership in the League. Not perceiving these ties, the Democrat~ charged, 
I 
;'The Republican ·party is responsible f'or the f'ailure to· restore p2.ace con-
1 
ditons in Europe., which is a principal cause of' post-armistice itlf'lation 
II·'\- I 
the world over." The Democratic campaigners, however, seldom raised the HCL 
issue. 
I . . ' 
Bef'ore their convention open_ed. on June 28, Democrats knew the. prob-
i ·. 
lem to overcome was "the complex but irresistible 
I 
disgust" of' Wilsonianism aroused by the· President's "quixotic excJ.rsions" to 
p.f ' . 
Europe, and his "one-man government .. '.' Hoping to hold progressives and 1·,orkers-
' 
the f'arm vote was written of'f'- in ·the party, they nominated James 'cox bedaus e 
he was not closely associated with Wilson. If' any doubts reciained of' 
Wilson's liability to the party, reports of' Steve Early, Franklin°D. Roosevelt's 
advance man, dispelled them. Working across ·the northwest f'rom Minneapolis, 
Sioux Falls, Butte, Seattle, Spokane, to ~~\3-~~' Early describet the.bitter-
ness, the antipathy against Wilson pe·rsonally "evident everywhere~and deeply . . n 
:booted". People, he f'ound, were 'I disinterested and uninf'ormed abovt the League 
of' Nations. Most wanted to kno;i "what they are going to get. thinking close. 
to home, their bread baskets and not o:l>th~i:t allies". The problel)l f'or the 
Democrats, prevalent everywhere, reinf'orced by the candidates me~ting 
Wilson in 'the White House on July l8, was the general impression! · . 
. . . . . I . . . 
that Wilson confa·olled ·cox. "If' people could be told that Wilson had stepped 
aside, it would mean a lot of' vot~s. As things stand, in their min~s- Cox 
. . · . · 11-0 I 
·will, if' elected_, merely continue the Wilson administration." The bemocratic. 
23 
campaigners were too supportive of Wilson's foreign policy to follow 
Early's strate[\y. Although prices sank 24 perce~t between JuiLy and electiOJ:\ 
day, the deflation was not enough to erase peoples! memories· of the.HCL 
campaign's aggravations .. and failure. The burden of Wilson.ianism, tpe sum. 
of the administration's failures to deal with postwar social, economic, 
and racial unrest, was too heavy for Cox and Roosevelt to bear. Of these 
problems, inflation, threatening every American's welfare, was most des-
tructive of. the Wilson coalition. This was not the only significance of 
the HCL. controversy on politics. 
The administration, trapped between the millstones of the conten~ .1 
ding interest groups, had antagonized each in its fruitless attempt to a:p-_ 
pease consumer demands for cost of living reductions. The pressures. that the 
. .' .. 
administration was subject to in the HCL months from organized interest groups, 
business, agr~culture, and to a lesser degree, unions, began during the war 
mobilization years. This development quickened. during the HCL experience when 
economic groups, lessening their reliance on the government's ability to pro-
tect the general welfare, turned to intensive lobbying.of the White House and 
Congressional committees to. advance their special interests. A decade before 
the labor movement joined them, trade associations and the farm bloc had 
shaped the modern political structure of special interest politics. 
i 
I 
·1 
I 
1Donald McCoy, "Election of 1920," Arthur Schlesinger Jr. , ed. , !Ii story 
of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968 (4 vols.; New York: MacGraw-
Hill, 1971) III, 2384-85; Fr.ank Friec"i.el, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal 
(Boston: Little, Brovm and Company, 1954), 
211 The Republiciin Avalanche," Literary Digest, 60(November 13, 1920), · 12. 
~ureau of Labor Statistics, '.fue Cost of Living in the U.S. : 1914-~92l(New 
York: National Industrial Conference Board,·1926), 162-67. (Hereafter BLS) 
4
Robert A. Gordon, Business Fluctuations (New York: Harper&Row, 1961), 
399-406; Charles Gilbert, Alilerican Financing of lforld War I (Westport, Ct.: 
Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1970), 25-41; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: 
The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1980), 105-05; 118-19. 
5Gordon, · Fluctuations, 401. . 
6Gordon, 402-03. 
7Kennedy, Over Here, 292-93; 242-44; 259-70. David Brody, Labor in Crisis: 
The Steel Strike of 1919 (New York: Lippincott, 1965), 78- 9. 
8Glass to Wilson, Marc~ 27, 1919, Carter Glass Papers (Alderman Library, 
University of Virginia), box 37; Robert Himmelberg, "Bnsiness; Antitru~t 
Policy, and the Industrial Board of the Department cif Commerce," Business 
History Review, XLII (Spirng, 1968), 1-23; Tumulty to Wilson, May~l919, 
Joseph P. Tumulty Papers (Manuscript Division,· Library of Congress), box 3 
9wallace' s Farmer, . 
lOMinutes of the Ex.ecutive Council, American Federation of Labor, May 9, 1919 
(AFL-CIO Library, Washington); Proceedings, Annual Convention, American Feder-' 
ation of Labor (Atlantic City, June 9-23, 1919), 229-30. 
llTumulty to Wilson, May l, 1919, Tumulty Papers, box 3. 
l2Glass to D1J.v:Ld Houston, Secretary of Agr:;.culture, Glass Papers, box 13[. 
l3For complaints about War Department, IV /60/79, Wilson Papers, and New York 
Times, July 10, 1919, 8. Ford criticism of food relief, New York Times, Janu-
ary 30, 1919, 4. . . 
14 . ' . 6 t Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd session,.vol. 57, 303 . Ho~ver o 
Wilson, November 4, 1918, December 16, 1918, January 8, 1919, .Iv/4010/566, 
Wilson .Papers. Memorandum on Wheat Guaranty Proclamation, September 2, 1918, 
rv/2067/478, Wilson Papers. • . 
l5McAdoo to Wilson, November 22, 1918., file: Wheat, General Records of the 
Bureau of Accounts-Treasury, Record Group 39, (National Recor.d Center, Sui tland, 
Md~), box 114. . 
16 ' Glass to Wilson, January 14, 1919, Glass Papers, box 37. Leffingwell to Glass, 
January 8, 1919, file: Food Administration, RG 39. 
l7Leffingwell to Glass, January 8, 1919, file: Food Administration, RG 39. 
18 New York Times; March 1, 1919, 1. 
l' 
,. 
' 
19
Hoove.r to Wilson, February 24, 1919, IV/2067/478, Wilson Papers.I 
20Glass to Wilson, February 27, 1919, .Glass Papers, box 37. 
1 
21Gordon, Fluctuations, 403. I 
2~rederick Lewi.s Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper Brothers[, 1931); 4-5 .. 
23
HCL Complaint File, IV/60/79, Woodrow Wilson Papers (Library of .
1
Congress); 
Petitions, The High Cost of Living, House Committee 011 Agricultur,e, .Record 
Group 233, General Records s:if the House s of Representatives., file' Hl. 2 (N~.- ' · 
tional· Archives). , 
24wiison to Barnes, April 5- and 16, 1919, IV/2067/478. Wilson Pape~s . 
. 25New York Times,January 14 .and·18,·1919, 
26
Glass to Tumulty; April i, 1919, Glass Papers, box 37. 
·z:r Proceedings, Annual Convention of National Association of Manufacturers 
(New York, June 22-25,·1919), 17; American Industries, June 1919, ~18-19. 
· 2~inutes, Executive Council, AFL, March 19, 1919. 
29Grain Deaie;; Jburnal, May 1, 1919, 906. 
30Financial and Commercial Chronicle, April 29, 1919, 1806. 
31:rumulty to Wilson, May 12, 1919; Tumulty Papers, box 3. 
3
2
"The.Menace of the Food Trust;''Literary Digest 60(July 26, 1919~,'42. 
33Tuimllty to Wilson, June'30; 1919, Tumulty Papers, box 3, 
w · I 
3~"Why We Must Still Pay War Prices," Literary Digest, 60(June 28; 1919), 9, 
3 Capper's Farmer, July, 1919, 4. 
36 -
New York Times, July 5, 1919, 19. 
3:Wilson to William Colver, chairman, Federal Trade.Commission, July 11, 1919, 
Wilson Papers, IV/6o/4. Annual Report· of the Federal Trade Commission 1920 
38-47. "Pa.ckers at the Bar of Public Opinion," Literary Digest 61(.Au~st 2 ' 
1919), 21-23. . I ' 
~ ' 
Pal!ai=r' 'tlo' 1Tilson, August 7 ,· 1919, Wilson Papers, IV /60/79, 
.3%ew York Times, August 7, 1919, 6. 
40E. David Cronon, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-l92l(University 
of Nebraska Press, 1963), entry for Ju1y·29,.1919. I · 
41cummings to Tumulty, J~ly 30, .i919; Tumulty Papers, box 3. Ne,·: York Times, 
August 1, 1919, _5. . I 
4 . I 
2McAdoo to Wilson, July 31, 1919, Wilson Papers, II/Letterbook 191. 
. I 
4BLiterary Digest, 59(February 3, 1919), 16. . 
44Cummings to TUmulty, July 14, 1919, Tumulty Papers; box 3. 
·45 . .. . . . 
Cummings to 1'?ilson, July 28, 1919, Tumulty Papers, box 3. 
46 . 
Hustom Thompson to Wilson, July 31, 1919, William Colver to· Wils:on, August 1, 
1919,-II/187, Kilson Papers. 4 .. 
7Barnes to Wilson, July 31, 1919, IV/40JJ3/567, Wilson Papers. 
4BRailway Wa~e ·Board to Hines, Hines to Wilson, July. 11; 1919, Stone to 
Wilson, July 29, 1919, Wilson Papers, IV/816/205. Brotherho.od of· Locomotive 
Firemen and Enginemen's Magazine, 67(September 1, 1919), 1-2. 
4~·11.lson to Palllle,-, July 31, 1919, .IV /60/79, Wilson Papers. f. 
50 
5lAugust 1, 1919, Cronon, Diaries. New York Times, August 2., 1919, 1. 
52nraft submitted to Conference at Attorney General' s Office, August 5, . 1919, 
General Correspondence of the Secretary, Record Group 56, General Records of 
the Department of the Treasury, file High Cost of Living, box 74 (National 
Archives). · 
53Earnes t.o Wilson, August 3., 1919, and Hoover to Wilson, August 3: a~d 5, 1919, 
IV/40IB/566, Hilson Papers. For Tumulty and Leffingwell press leaks that 
government planning to sell wheat at 75 cents a bushel,. Tumulty to Leffingwell, 
A1l511st 1, 1919, Housewives League to Tumulty, August 3, 1919, Glass Papers, 
box 37. New York Times, August 5, 1919, 5. 
54Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson(2 vols., New York: Harper&Row, 1927), .. I, 564-68. 
55Palmer to Wilson, August 22, 1919, Wilson Papers, II(Letterbook 191. 
5
6
New York Times, August 29, 1919, 1. 
57 Justice, September 9, 1919, 2. Other union protests: Amalgamate~ Clothing 
Workers of America, Advance, September 8, 1919, 3; Chicago Federation of 
Labor, The New Majority, August 16, 1919, 2. 
51\:ennedy, Over Here, 100-02, 118~9·. 
59;'How To Bring Dmm Prices," Independent, December 13, 1919, 1.67. 
60 . 
_Palmer to Figg, August 21, 1919, and Outline of the Organization of the 
~~gh Cost of Living Division, October 1919, file 24-0-37, RG 60. 
Palmer to St~te F?od Admin~str~tors,· August 9, 1919, file 24-06, RG 60; 
~~morandum, .Fair Price Organizations in the States, fi-le 24-0-191A, RG 60. 
A. Mitchell Palmer, "To the Women of Americ~," General Federation Magazine 
September 1919 7 · · · · · ··· .,,. · · · - · · ' - · · - '· 
.•• • ' ' ' • •"--·~~..._,, •• ..._";i,;_:, - "'~- .·.::._:· ~·.:.:: .. :: - - --::::.__.._.... ·:-- ~.' :·-..... ·. 
6~ew York Times, October 14;· 1919, 24. 
~Report, Divis~on of Women's Aetivities, February 18, 1920, file:24-0-8, RG 60. 
HCL Pledge, file 24-0-8, RG 60; Speaking Tour Schedules file 24-0-211A RG 60 
66 . . . '· , . 
October 1919, 3, , 
67Hoarding ·Food Products, September 1917-December 1919, file 18713b, RG 60,: 
I 
I 
68Einporia G_'.'-zette, August 21, 1919. 
69 't D'' . t Li era.ry iges , August 23, 1919, 11. 
69"War Declared on Profiteering;" Literary Digest, 6l(August 23, ;t-919), ll. 
70New York< Times, August 10, 1919, 18. I 
7lTUmulty to W:.lson, February 4, 1919, TUmulty Papers, box 3. '. 
' 
72niary of Edward House, January l, 1920 (Sterling Library, Yale UniVErsity). 
73 New York Times, February 27, 1919, l. 
74congressional Record, 3rd Session, 65th Congress, 5003-27. 
'(5Hearings on R.R. 10376, Senate, Committee on Agriculture, Extension of the 
Food Control Act, September 3, 1919, 12-14. 
76Financial andCommercial Chronicle, August 16, 1919, 636. 
77Hearings, High Cost of Living, House Committee on Agricult11re, August 15, 
1919 ~ 16-27. 
7~allace' s Farmer, August. 22, 1919, 1613. 
79Lobbying for antitrust exemption for cooperative. !marketing associati.ons 
was intensive. Petitions and Memorials, Collective Bargaining, House Judiciary 
Committee, file 66A-Hll.5, RG 233. · 
~. and David Houston, Agriculture Secreta±:y to Wilson, August 14, 1919, 
file 165 A, General Records of the Department of Agriculture, Record Group 16 
(National Archives). "The Farmer Not the Villain in the High Pric~ Drama '' 
_Lfilterary Digest, 6l(December 20, 1919), 18-19. ' 
80Petitions and Memorials, Food Control Act, Committee on Interstate K'Ommerce, 
· file 66A-Hl0.ll, and Petitions, Cost of Living, Committee on Agriculture, 
.file 66Ahl.2, RG 233. 
81_ ' 
.--Palmer to Henry Stuart, a friend, October 14, 1919, file 24-0-14, RG 60 
82Leffingwell to Glass, September 6, 1919, Glass Papers, box 144. 
83Glass to Wilson, September 12, 1919, Glass Papers, box 144. 
84wilson to TUmul·cy, September 8, 1919, TUmulty.Papers, box 3. 
85TUmulty to Palmer, October 26, 1919, file 150179, RG 60. 
86Cronon, Diaries, 
87Annual Report of the Attorney General,1920, 36-39. 
88David Lawrence cO'llunn, Springfield. Republican; November 8, 1919, 26. 
89Amost Pinchot Papers(Library of Congress), box ll, November · 
89November 
' 
' 89December. ll, 1919,.Amos Pinchot Papers (Library of Congress), 
90The Woman Citizen-, January 3, 1920. 
91Justice, De_cember 14, .1919, 2. Wallace'.s·Farmer, December 12, 
9~rs, 165 
~ox ll. 
1 
Jl919, 2562. 
93New York Tinies, September 14, 1919, part VII:3, December 7, 
part IV: 3 .. Independent, August 23, 1919, 239. 
94 . 
. Capper's Farmer, December, 1919, 12. 
95January 29, 1920, 14-15. 
96 . 
Albert Sykes, president, Report of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting (Des Moines~ 
}i'ebrtiary, 8-11, J.920), 10-12. • 
97Dry Goods Economist, September 26, 1919, 6-7, 
98
Proceedings, Annual Convention, Missouri ·Farmers' Association (Sedalia, 
September 2~4_, 1919), 16. Farmer protests to White House Wilson·· Papers 
IV /60/70. · ' I ' 
99Pr d" F' t Ann. 1 C t" · · . I ocee ings, irs . ua onven ion, American Farm Bureau Federation 
(C~cago, November 10-.14, 1919), 21. Pro~eedings, Annual Convention, Inter-
national Farm Congress,(Kansas City, September 20-22, 1919),.14; J 
lOO"The Onsluaght of High Prices," Literar0; Digest '60(Agust 16, 1919), 12~13. . I 
101capper's Farmer, November 19,· 1919, 6. 
102Palmer to Figg, December 11, 1919, file 24-0-11, RG 60. 
l03Speech Stuff, HCL, Women's Camapign,' file 24-0-8 ,' Paiiner 
Strauss, director, January 14, 1920,file 24-0-8, .RG 60 
104copy in Secretary's Correspondence, Department of Labor, 
I 
: 
I 
to Edith 
I 
. I 
Recordl Group 
I 
174, file 167/155 (National Archives. 
l05Journal of c·ommerce, August 23, 1920; 14; Power, 
·Nation's Business, September 1919, 40; Independent, 
106Independent, December 20, 1919, 6. 
I 
January 27, 1920, 14; 
December 26, 1:919, 6. 
l07National.Retail ~lothiers Association, National Garment Retail Association, 
National Association of Clothiers, ~nd National Retail Dry Goods ~ssociation 
were at meeting. Memorand\llll, Conference with Retail Clothfiers.Committee in 
Figg's Office at 11:00 a.m;, January 15, 1920, file 24-0-16; RG60;'. National 
Clothier, January 15, 1920, 1-23 for retail clothiers grievances ~gainst 
government. . 
108Testimon~ of Armin w. Riley of. Figg' s staff: Hearings, House,<· 9ubcom.11i ttee 
of Com.11ittee on Appropriations, Tnird Deficiency Bill, Fiscal Year; 1920, 301-03. 
iL09Final Repo:vt, Women's Ac ti vi ties, November )_, 1920, file 24-o-i6, RG 60. 
liostatement of the Work of the Cost of.Living Division ~f the Bureau of 
Investigation for the Fiscal Year 1919-1920, ·file: 24-0-11, RG 60; 
· ll~ransc;ipt of case, file 24-0-17, RG 60. · . 
112Transc±ipt of L. Cohen Grocery Com.apny case, 24-0-17, RG ·Go. 
113 
·Chief Justice Edward D. White wrote the majority opinion of the Court that 
section 4 of the Lever Act was·inviolation of the 5th and 6th amendments. He 
agreed with defendants that the heart of matte:t:.was "the certaint~ or uncer-
tainty of the text which failed to fix an ascerta.inable .':tanda.rd of guilt or 
to inform adequately the nature of the accusation." The law was sb.va.gue in. 
its terms that it denied due process of law. The'United States off America, 
Plaintiff v. L. Cohen Grocery·Company, Transcipts of Records and File Copies 
of Briefs, 1920, vol. 88, cases 324-45 (Supreme Court Library, Washin.gton). 
r-
114
Figg to Palmer, n.d., file 24-0.-232x, RG 60. 
ll5New York.Times, May 14, 1920, 17. 1 
ll6file 24~,0-11, RG 60. i · 
ll7LeITingwell to Glass, September 19, 1919, Glass Papers, box 11;4. 
11~eport Covering the History, Scope, anclActi vi ties· of the Fair ·b.ice 
Organizations, October 10, 1920, fileh:~ Q-17 .RG 60. : 
119 "Di;.e. 'l1t1"'' '" YJ9~/.1"r3 
Palmer toWilson, ,J:iil 0r 2a, 1919,....;P., l"f9, Wilson Papers. 
12<\iterary Digest July 31, 1920, 57. 
121 . 
Gordon, Fluctuations, 403. '; 
12~cCoy; "Election of 1920," Schlesinger, President~al Elections) rII, 2384. 
123senate Investigation of the Department of Justice, Women's Organization 
in. Connection with Campaign Expenditures. file 24-0-14, RG 60. Hearings, 
Presidential Campaign ·.Expenses, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Privileges in Elections, 66th C0ngess, I, 1022-56. '· 
I 
' 
I 
.12~cCoy, "Ele.ction of 1920, ", Schlesinger, Presidential Elections, III, 23~6. 
125"The Republican Avalanche;" .Literary Digest,' 6l(Novernber 13, 1920), 11-14: 
126 . . . ' 
· Steve Early to Louis Howe, August 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 22, 1920, Vice-
President Candidate, boxes 3 and"l4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers(Presiden-
tial Libr·ary, Hyde Park, N.Y.). 
" 
